Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here with us. I know this is a difficult

assignment you have been given by evidence of the fact that

Ambassador Rodman last week visited North Korea and was not

able to accomplish much either.

I know.

You said a moment ago that you are guardedly optimistic that

at some point this could be resolved through negotiations. I want

to share with you my impressions based on the work we have done

here and in some other committees that I serve on and get your

impressions of that.

My impressions are that the North Korean regime—what they

seek more than anything else is legitimacy and acceptance for who

they are and what they are. And in essence, what they are looking

for is the following. They want the world to accept them as a

nuclear power. They want to be legitimized as a government that

the world accepts as is despite all of the atrocities they commit and

all the weird things they do abroad. And they want to be accepted

and they want to be insulated from foreign interference in their affairs.

And they have concluded that the only way they can accomplish

these things is by being a nuclear power. And their strategy

for moving forward on all these things is this series of escalations

with potential off-ramps along the way that they conduct.

So, for example, they do these tests on the missiles. They conduct

weapons tests. They say outrageous things like they are going to—

I forgot their exact rhetoric used a week ago about wiping out the

U.S. forces if they conduct a joint exercise. I think it was last night

or this morning that they said they were going to strike us here

in the homeland.

The point is that they use this escalating rhetoric and the actions

that they take to further all this and to scare people or to get a

reaction from the world toward one goal, and that one goal is very

simple, to get the world to say, fine, North Korean regime, you can

keep your weapons. We will accept you as who you are. That is

their goal.

And I am not sure how we can negotiate them out of that position

at this point. I think that is very difficult. For example, I think

they sit there and decide, do we want to be Muammar Qaddafi or

Saddam Hussein or do we want to be here forever and be able to

hold onto this thing. And once we have a nuclear weapon and particularly

once we have the capability of striking the United States

at the homeland, they will have no choice but to accept us. And

everything they do between now and then is just to delay or buy

time or to scare us into a position of negotiation.

That does not mean I do not also hope that one day they will

wake up and say, hey, this is bad for us. I just do not think a government

like this can survive if they had to somehow get rid of

their weapons and engage the world in a civilized way. And that

is my concern. Why does this matter? For two reasons. And this is

what I really wanted to share with you.

No 1, because I believe that if you are Japan, if you are South

Korea, if you are other countries in the region, if North Korea continues

to expand and, in fact, it gets global acceptance of their

nuclear program, they are going to want one as well. So I think

this fear of an escalation of nuclear weapons in the region is very

real.

And the second concern that we have is that other countries are

measuring their behavior. I think Iran is closely watching what is

happening with North Korea. By the way, Iran has very similar

goals. They want to be accepted as the government that they are,

and they want to be insulated from foreign interference. And they

think the nuclear weapons system is the way to do it. And they are

watching very closely the way North Korea is being treated by the

global community and determining from that how they need to proceed

forward.

So I do not share this guarded optimism. I hope I am wrong. I

really do. But the reality of it is, I think, the best we can hope for

here is three things.

No. 1, we have to do everything we can to delay and preferably

prevent them from accomplishing the goal of being able to reach

the United States or the West with these weapons.

No 2, we should never allow the world to forget who these people

are and what they are doing. And their list of atrocities is too long

to catalog here today, but they kidnap people abroad. Any religion,

particularly Christianity, is banned, punishable by death. Google

has begun to catalog all these gulags that they have all over the

country. The list goes on and on.

And third, I think we need to begin to create the conditions, God

willing, for reunification, which is impossible today. Today that is

not going to happen. But we do not know when the moment comes

if those conditions become possible. And I think we need to do

everything we can, along with our partners in the region and the

world, to create the conditions where hopefully one day we could

have a unified, democratic, peaceful Korea. And that is not possible

today, but we can begin to create the conditions where hopefully

one day that will be possible. Who could have predicted East

Germany would have fallen, but it did. And one of the best ways

we can do that is to strengthen and continue to strengthen our relationship

economically and militarily with South Korea.

Those are my general impressions of this issue. I know that as

a diplomat, your job is to try to bring a resolution to this that is

negotiated. I just do not think that is going to happen with this guy

because I think they are convinced that the only way they are ever

going to accomplish what they want is by having a nuclear program

and being able to hold the world hostage with it.

Can I just ask about the: Are we potentially in

the midst of a recalibration among Chinese policymakers with

regard to the utility of their current situation with North Korea?

Is it possible that we are in the moment that the Chinese are looking

at the situation and saying they are no longer what they once

were? We really do not need the headache that these guys are.